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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE TALE OF TWO LAKES-A NEW CHAPTER IN
WASHINGTON WATER LAW1
The State of Washington, through its Department of Game, purchased waterfront lots on Phantom and Ames Lakes2 and developed
both properties into public fishing access areas. 3 Large numbers of the
public took advantage of these facilities, fishing from boats and the
lake-shore.4 The two lakes, however, were not the kind found in true
fishermen's dreams, isolated from civilization and surrounded by for-ests primeval. Both Phantom and Ames Lakes were surrounded by
numerous residences, whose owners brought separate actions to enjoin
the State from maintaining the public access areas, alleging nuisance
and abuse of the lakes by the State's licensees. 5 The trial courts found
'The omission of a general introductory survey and discussion of Washington
water law prior to the principal cases is justified by three excellent articles.
Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 580
(1960); Johnson, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1 (1967); Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch,
31 WASH. L. REv. 243 (1956).
'These lakes, though some miles distant from one another, are situated in the
northern portion of King County, Washington. Under the present law of Washington, both lakes are non-navigable bodies of water. See Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash.
606, 236 P. 114 (1925).
'These access areas generally included a large parking area and facilities for
launching small boats. There was no attempt by the State to develop the access areas
into public parks or similar recreation grounds.
'Interviews with residents on Phantom and Ames Lakes, and persons who had
utilized the access areas during fishing season, confirmed that the lakes were extremely popular fishing waters. The largest crowds were to be found at the lakes
on "opening day" and on the weekends.
Residents and witnesses agree that the greatest evidence of the lakes' popularity
was the first day of every fishing season. Fishermen would begin arriving well
before dawn and, after either placing their boats in the water or finding an attractive place on the lake-shore, a veritable celebration would ensue until first-light.
A person, viewing the lakes at dawn, would behold scores of boats on all parts of
the lakes and fishermen every few yards along the lake-shore.
,The plaintiffs alleged, and the trial courts found as fact, that the State's
licensees had, by their conduct and numbers, caused the following results: (1) The
market value of the plaintiffs' property had been decreased; (2) Thievery had substantially increased, including the theft of boats, boating equipment, furniture, and
other personal property; (3) Persons had relieved themselves in the lake and on the
plaintiffs' property, causing plaintiffs, their families and guests annoyance and
embarrassment; (4) Various items of garbage had been deposited in the lake and
upon plaintiffs' property; (5) Plaintiffs suffered frequent trespasses on their yards,
docks, beaches, and other property; (6) Plaintiffs and their families had suffered
personal injuries from broken bottles and other debris deposited on their property;
(7) Fishermen, trespassing on plaintiffs' beaches and docks, often harassed members
of plaintiffs' families; (8) Although hunting and shooting on the lakes were
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as fact that such abuses had occurred and persisted, and concluded that
the State's maintenance of such facilities unreasonably interfered with
the property owners' rights, constituting a taking and damaging of
property without compensation in violation of the Washington State
Constitution.6 Based on these facts and conclusions, the trial courts
permanently enjoined the State of Washington from maintaining and
operating the public fishing access areas. Upon appeal by the State,
the lower courts' injunctions were modified to provide that the State
would be enjoined only until it obtained the trial courts' approval of
comprehensive plans for regulating public use of the lakes. With this
modification, the judgments of the trial courts were affirmed. Held:
The State, where it enjoys riparian rights, need not acquire by condemnation the rights of other riparians before its licensees may use the
water in reasonable numbers, but it has the obligation to regulate the
number and conduct of its licensees so as to prevent undue interference with the rights of other riparians. Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d
751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Ames Lake Community Club v. State, 69
Wn. 2d 769, 420 P.2d 363 (1966).
The majority of the court, though without expressly so holding,
accepted the State's contention that it enjoyed riparian status.8 From
this premise, the court concluded that such status created an inherent
obligation to police and control State licensees in order to prevent
injury to the rights of other riparians. After adverting to, and incorillegal, persons came onto the lakes and engaged in such activities; (9) Uncontrolled
speed boating endangered plaintiffs and their families while swimming in the
lakes; (10) The noise level on and around the lake had greatly increased.
'WASH.
CONST. amend. IX provides: "No private property shall be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first
made...."
"Only four judges joined in the court's opinion. With an equal number joining
in dissent, it was left to Judge Finley, concurring specially, to cast the decisive
vote. This close division of the court reflects the difficult and evenly balanced
policy considerations involved in the instant cases.
'In the instant cases the State had acquired fee title to the riparian property.
The law is long-established in Washington that riparian rights are "inextricably
annexed" to fee-ownership of riparian property. See Hayward v. Mason, 54 Wash.
653, 104 P. 141 (1909) ; Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 P. 147
(1894). Therefore, the court's premise that the State, by acquisition of fee title to
the two riparian properties, enjoyed riparian status was entirely correct.
Whether the State would enjoy riparian status by acquisition of a lake-front
easement has yet to be determined by the court. This determination may well rest
upon the court's classification of the property interests encompassed by an easement.
Notwithstanding the result of that classification, it would appear that the purpose of
the easement may be dispositive. If the easement were acquired for the purpose of
providing public access to a watercourse or lake, there would be greater reason to
conclude that the easement carried with it those riparian rights necessary to fulfill
its purpose.
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porating by reference, an addendum9 surveying prior decisions involving riparian rights in Washington,'0 the court stated that it considered
the recent decision in Snively v. Jaber" to be controlling, thereafter
relying on the language of that opinion to support its decision.
In his concurring 'opinion, Judge Finley characterized the problem
before the court as one of "balancing of interests and rights.' 2 Stating that there were a number of factors'8 to be considered, he reasoned
that what was needed, rather than a strict riparian rights analysis, was
a practical common-sense approach, balancing the need to protect
private rights against the need to provide for maximum public use of
Washington's lakes.
The dissent concurred with the court's refusal to adopt the trial
courts' permanent injunction, but vigorously objected to the decree of a
temporary injunction until implementation of an approved plan of lake
regulation. Finding "no authority in law or in equity to enjoin all
members of the public for the misconduct of a few,"' 14 the dissent
argued that only those abusing the lakes and riparian property should
be enjoined. The core of the dissent's reasoning was that maintenance
of the access facilities was within State police power, and to enjoin
operation of the facilities not only would be contrary to statutory com'69 Wn.2d at 757, 420 P.2d at 356.

the court's addendum, following discussion of Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash.
606, 236 P. 114 (1925), a comment of potential significance in the future development
of Washington water law is made, 69 Wi.2d at 758:
It must be noted that this very broad statement [referring to the preceding
quotation from Proctor v. Sim] may be limited to the arid portions of this
state; and that, in subsequent cases in the western part of the state, a lowering
of a lake or an interference with its riparian uses creates liabilities and, on
occasion, a necessity for condemnation.
With this cdmment, the court suggests for the first time that the scope of, and protection afforded, riparian rights may vary between western and eastern Washington.
A prominent authority on Washington water law has suggested that in evaluating
methods of water control and use it is necessary to consider the different climatological conditions prevailing in eastern and western Washington. Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 580, 583 (1960).
Although consideration of differing climatological conditions may be proper in
determining "reasonableness" or assessing the most "beneficial use" of lakes, it is
submitted that allowing geography to per se vary established legal rights within the
same state is highly questionable.
IL48 Wn.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
2269 Wn.2d at 762, 420 P.2d at 360.
" These factors were: (1) The increasing interest and recreational needs of the
public in fishing in the non-navigable lakes of the state; (2) The establishment of
state fish hatcheries for propagation of game fish, coupled with the acquisition of
lakefront, public-access areas to waters stocked by the state; (3) The fact that the
state had not acquired complete ownership of all the water-front property on lakes
having public-access areas; (4) The fact that much of the water-front property, on
such lakes as Phantom and Ames Lakes, is held in private ownership by numerous
individuals.
" 69 Wn.2d at 766, 420 P.2d at 362.
'In
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mand, 15 but also would re-establish private fishing lakes. Also discernible in the dissenting opinion was the thought that a State program,
properly within the police power, should not be subject to judicial
approval as a condition precedent to its operation. Finally, the dissent
stated that one who resides on a lake, such as Phantom or Ames Lake,
must take his property with the benefits of its location, and the correlative burdens of public use of the water for recreation.
The premise that the State enjoys the status of a riparian by
acquiring property abutting non-navigable lakes should not have led
the court to conclude summarily that the determination of rights in the
instant cases was controlled by Snively v. ]aber. That case involved a
contest between two private riparians wherein the plaintiff, a land
developer, obtained an injunction against his neighbor's allowing customers of his small resort to boat on the lake, because such persons had
littered and abused property that the plaintiff had been attempting to
develop and market. Although analogous, significant distinctions exist
between this decision and the principal cases. First, the State, when
holding property for use by the public, is a unique riparian whose
powers and number of potential licensees clearly differentiate it from
private riparians. The law of eminent domain is illustrative of the
disparity between the powers of the State and those of the citizen. 6
Once the State has acquired riparian status, by eminent domain or
otherwise, and developed access facilities for use by the public without
charge or limitation, it becomes self-evident that the number of its
licensees far exceeds the number gaining access to the lake from the
property of a private riparian. Second, the law of riparian rights has
developed in contests between private persons, such as occurred in
7
Snively v. faber.1
It is ill-suited for application to a dispute between a
'5 WASH. REv. CODE § 90.03.010. The language upon which the dissent particularly
relied was: "Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the
public..."
"The State enjoys the power of eminent domain by which it may acquire riparian
land or condemn the riparian rights of private property. WASH. REv. CoDE § 90.03.040.
The private riparian does not ordinarily possess this power, nor can he usually
successfully resist the State's exercise of this power for a proper objective pursuant
to the required procedures. The Washington Water Code does provide that "[A]ny
person may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any property or rights
... " for the storage or application of water for the greatest public benefit. WASH.
REv. CoDE § 90.03.040. However, before a private person may exercise this right, he
must prove not only that his use would be more beneficial, but also that such use would
be of public benefit.
1 Although the right of use of the lake by the licensees of one of the litigants was
involved in that case, the heart of the controversy was the conflicting interests of two
riparians in the use of the lake surface.
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private riparian, or class of such riparians, and the State acting as
representative of the general public's competing interest. 8
Finally, Snively v. Jaberprimarily involved the conflict of two private persons in the use of a single lake. Only secondarily involving the
interests and property rights'9 of individuals in particular lakes, the
primary conflict in the instant cases was between "private rights" and
"public rights." This conflict is best characterized as a confrontation
of the competing socio-legal policies of protection of private property
rights and provision for public recreational development of Washington's lakes.
The court's decisions may be interpreted as an extension of the
reasonable-use-in-common principle of Snively v. Jaber to such controversies as existed in the principal cases. Although this principle may be
utilitarian in litigation between parties of relatively equal interests, it is
of questionable value when parties represent greatly unequal and dissimilar interests. Reasonableness is but the foundation from which the
court, with appreciation of the unique nature of the controversies
created by the State's involvement, should have fashioned a more
comprehensive analysis.
It is significant that the court was careful to state that it was not
necessary to condemn the riparian rights of private riparians on the
lakes in order to maintain and operate the public access facilities.
However, the court did not foreclose the alternative of such condemnation by proceedings in eminent domain. Therefore, the State may
28

In Snively v. faber, the licensees' right to use the lake depended upon the riparian rights of the private riparian licensors. The licensees in the instant cases sought
to come upon the lakes in their own right as members of the public. In these cases the
State only acted as the public's representative in the adjudication of the extent of permissible public use of the lakes.
It has been suggested that Snively v. faber has analogous application to the instant
cases because in both instances the licensees' rights were derived from the riparian
status of the licensor. Such analogical reasoning fails to appreciate the nature and
source of the licensees' rights in each case. The licensees' rights in Snively v. Jaber
were wholly derivative, Mr. Jaber's rights determining the extent of use which his
licensees could make of the lake. The licensees in the instant cases, although coming
upon the lakes over State-owned riparian property, claimed a right of use in their own
right as members of the public. The basis of this claimed right was the statutory
dedication of such waters to the public. See WASH. REv.,CoDE § 90.03.010. With assertion of this direct right of use, the controversies concerning Phantom and Ames
Lakes became conflicts between relatively small groups of riparian landowners and the
public.
Although recognizing the language of the statute, the court dealt with the State as
if it were a riparian landowner. It is submitted that the possible dangers of this
approach, in terms of restrictive definition of reasonable use, are as great as those
inherent to the private riparian in adoption of any "public trust" approach.
" A riparian right is a property right in Washington. In re Clinton Water
Dist., 36 Wn. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950); cf. Litka v. Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9
P.2d 88 (1932).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 475

operate access facilities pursuant to a comprehensive regulatory plan,

as directed by the court, or it may condemn the riparian rights of all
private property on the lakes and operate access facilities without a
regulatory plan. The latter alternative, however, would be one of last
resort because of the substantial expense of the condemnation
20
awards.

It is also significant that the court did not proceed under any theory
of "public trust," nor did it construe the Washington Water Code 2 ' as

granting the State pre-emptive rights in non-navigable lakes. These
theories, though available to the court, have as yet to find favor in any
Washington decision. The Washington Water Code does declare that
"[A] 11 waters within the state belong to the public." 2 However, this
phrase is qualified by the introductory words, "Subject to existing
rights .... ,,'2s The court's failure to adopt either a public-trust or pre-

emption theory would seem to indicate the validity of two conclusions.
First, public ownership and any trustee-power of the State are limited

to those waters not already appropriated or subject to existing riparian
rights. Second, the language, "Subject to existing rights," qualifies the
extent of State control of lakes, and inhibits pre-emptive rights being
exercised by the State in such waters.
The court wisely rejected the two solutions to the controversies
urged by the dissent. The first solution was that protection of private
rights and full recreational use of the lakes would be served best by

individual civil and criminal actions against persons committing the
alleged abuses. The dissent's second solution was that persons owning
lake-front property should be required to enjoy the benefits of such
location along with the abuses and wrongdoing by certain members of
the public. Implementation of the dissent's first solution would place
responsibility for control and regulation of lake use upon the private
'In addition to the acquisition of footage on the immediate periphery of the
lakes, the State would properly be required to compensate owners of lake-front property for the other recognized riparian rights. Perhaps the most important compensable right involved would be the use of the lake for recreation. See Snively v. Jaber, 48
Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956). In Washington, a riparian also has an established
right to have a lake remain at such a level, and in such a condition, as to not detract
from the scenic or aesthetic value of the riparian property. Cf. In re Martha Lake
Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929). There is also a recognized riparian right
to use the lake for irrigation or drainage. See In re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wn. 2d
284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950). These rights, as well as the appraised value of the actual
property condemned by the state, are property interests protected by the Washington
State Constitution. See In re Clinton Water Dist., supra; Litka v. Anacortes, 167
Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932) ; In re Martha Lake Water Co., supra.
' WAsH. REv. CODE § 90.03.010.
2 Id.
2 Id.
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property owners. It is doubtful that this responsibility could be effectively discharged without these persons retaining a small "police force"
to determine the identity of persons committing trespass and to apprehend those committing criminal acts. Rather than placing the burden
of regulation, and its inherent costs, upon the State as the court required, the dissent effectively would have placed it on the lake residents. Because the State was responsible for bringing the public upon
the lake, as part of a comprehensive plan for increasing recreational
opportunities for its citizens, the dissent's determination of regulatory
responsibility would appear unjust and inequitable. The second solution advanced by the dissent is no less troublesome than the first. A
property owner may reasonably be expected and required to take his
property subject to municipal or State easements for subterranean or
surface utilities. Residents on the shore of a navigable body of water,
such as Lake Washington or Puget Sound, may fairly be called upon to
endure occasional raucous speed-boats or to evict waterfront hikers
who may stray onto their property. However, the resident on the shore
of a relatively small non-navigable lake, having paid a premium for
privacy and accessibility to water recreation, cannot reasonably be said
to take his property subject to the abuses and depredations proven to
have taken place on and about Phantom and Ames Lakes.
In his concurring opinion, 24 Judge Finley employed the proper analysis in resolving the controversy, the basis of which he defined as "the
uncontrolled, indiscriminate public use, and, more importantly, the
25 of the lakes. He concluded that "a common sense"
destructive abuse"1
balancing of the private property interests of the lakeside residents and
the interests of the public in the fullest development of recreational
resources was required. 26 Regulation of State licensees, as a solution to
such controversies as those in the instant cases, is properly supported
by such "balancing of interests," and reflects that the overriding issue
is one of competing social policies rather than mere adjudication of
conflicting property rights.27
' 69 Wn. 2d at 761, 420 P2d at 359.
0 Id. at 762, 420 P.2d at 360.
'Although in concurring Judge Finley commended the majority opinion, it
would appear the commendation was directed to its result rather than its reasoning
since he criticized resolution of the controversy by application of the doctrine of
riparian rights as being too restrictive and limited.
Cardozo writes: "Finally, when the social needs demand one settlement rather
than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends." B. CAwozo, THE NATUnE OF
TaE JuDiciAL PRocEss, 65 (1922).
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Despite the significant social aspects adhering in controversies typified by the principal cases, a more precise and utilitarian "balancing of
interests" analysis should be employed. The basic principle of such an
analysis should be: Whether the use, or abuse, of a lake by State
licensees constitutes an actionable wrong depends upon, and is measured by, the residential and commercial development of the riparian
property. Such measurement goes, primarily, to the quantum of proof
required of riparian property owners to show unreasonable interference with their property interests, and thereby compel State regulation of its licensees using the lake. If the riparian property is minimally developed, the property owners would be required to show gross
abuse or permanent damage in order to compel regulation. By contrast, if the lake is bordered by substantially developed property,
owners of that property would be required to prove only minor abuse
and continuing misconduct by the State's licensees in order to compel
regulation. In sum, whether State regulation would be decreed would
depend primarily upon the kind and extent of damage to the lake and
riparian property, as measured against the overall existing development
of the riparian property. This analysis must, in all cases, incorporate
the general test of reasonableness, allowing the court to consider additional factors2" when necessary.
Under the suggested analysis the State would be free, initially, to
create and operate fishing and recreation access facilities without regulation. Should the riparian property owners object to the conduct or
number of the State's licensees, their proper course would be an action
to enjoin unregulated use of the lake by the State's licensees. 9 At trial
the court would employ the suggested analysis to determine whether
the riparians should obtain relief. Should the court determine that the
State's operation of the facilities, absent regulation, constitutes unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's rights, regulation would
properly be decreed." Should the riparian property owners fail to
prove that the alleged abuses, measured against riparian property
Typical factors that may assume importance in particular cases are the size of
the lake, the configuration of the lake, and the population density in the general
lbcality. The court should be free to consider any other factors relevant to the question of general "reasonableness."
Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that riparians, acquiring residences
on the lake subsequent to establishment of conditions alleged to constitute unreasonable interference with their interests, would not be estopped to compel State regulation of the lake.
' The court should have broad discretion in framing the decree in this type of
controversy. The decree should be tailored to the particular conditions and abuses in
each case, and should have reference to seasonal patterns of abuse where they exist.
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development and other relevant factors, entitle them to relief, regulation would not be decreed and the State would be free to continue its
access facility operations as before.

Resolution of such controversies by the suggested analysis has several practical and beneficial results. First, a "balancing of interests" is
achieved by an analysis affording guidance to both attorney and judge.

Second, should the State desire to develop access areas, or similar
facilities, without assuming the financial burdens of regulation, such
development could be accomplished on those lakes not surrounded by
substantial residential or commercial development. Finally, should the
State undertake creation of access facilities on lakes with substan-

tially developed riparian property, it would be required to assume the
legitimate responsibility of regulation. It is submitted that such results
are equitable and advantageous to both the interests of private property owners and the interests of the State in maximizing the fishing and
recreational development of Washington's lakes.
Although the court's reasoning may be subjected to criticism, and
alternative analyses may be suggested, its decisions in the principal
cases are commendable. State regulation of the lakes which it opens
for public use is not only equitable, but also preserves established legal
rights while furthering a sound social policy.3s The Washington Court
has again distinguished itself as a leader in the continuing development

of water law.

" There is little question that the expansion of sports and recreational opportunities for the general public constitutes sound public policy. The only question that
may yet remain is the specific remedy which the court fashioned to achieve this
policy. The State was required, prior to further operation of its access facilities, to
submit a regulatory plan to the trial court for approval. There are no expressions in
any of the opinions of the majority or dissent questioning that the State is within
its police power in operating the lake access facilities. It might be suggested, therefore,
that the decree required the State, in the performance of a program within its police
powers, to obtain judicial approval as a condition precedent to its implementation. This
poses interesting questions of the constitutionality, or at least propriety, of the court's
decree, particularly in regard to the very basic doctrine of separation of powers.

